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Diversity Jurisdiction for Citizens of
The District of Columbia
The Constitution of the United States provides that "The judi-
cial Power shall extend.., to Controversies... between Citizens
of different States."' As to the inferior federal courts, 2 this provi-
sion is not self-executing; 3 Congress must act to distribute the
judicial power among the courts and to confer upon them jurisdic-
tion.4 The legislative discretion is so wide that Congress could
withhold all diversity jurisdiction.5 Indeed, Congress was under no
constitutional obligation to create the district courts or any inferior
federal courts.6 But the first session of the first Congress did create
inferior federal courts and did grant jurisdiction based on diversity
of citizenship. 7
'U. S. CONST. ART. III, § 2 (1).
2 The Constitution does, of course, grant directly to the Supreme Court
judicial power and jurisdiction which Congress is powerless to withdraw.
Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1922), and cases there cited.
1 HUGHES, FEDERAL PRACTICE §95 (1931).
31In re Higdon, 269 Fed. 150 (D. Mo. 1920); Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Champlin, 21 Fed. 85, 89 (C.C.N.Y. 1884).
4 People v. Bruce, 129 F. 2d 421 (C.C.A. 9th 1942), cert. denied, 317
U.S. 678, rehearing denied, 317 U.S. 710 (1942); Ex parte Wisner, 203 U.S.
449 (1906); Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U.S. 1 (1905); Turner v. Bank of North
America, 4 Dall. 10 (U.S. 1800); Dewar v. Brooks, 16 F. Supp. 636 (D. Nev.
1936); In re Higdon, 269 Fed. 150 (D. Mo. 1920); 1 HUGHES, FEDERAL PRACTICE
§235 (1931).
5Feely v. Schupper Interstate Hauling System, 72 F. Supp. 663 (D.
Md. 1947); Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943); Lauf v. Shinner &
Co., 303 U.S. 323 (1938); Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U.S. 226
(1922); Sheldon v. Sill, 8 How. 441 (U.S. 1850); Cary v. Curtis, 3 How.
236, 244-245 (U.S. 1845). And Congress could take away jurisdiction once
granted, even as to cases already commenced as cognizable actions. Kline
v. Burke Construction Co.,supra, citing Assessors v. Osborne (Gates v.
Osborne), 9 Wall. 567, 575 (U.S. 1869). See note 2 supra. But see Winkler
v. Daniels, 43 F. Supp. 265, 266 where District Judge Way quotes, arguendo,
from H. R. REP. No. 1756, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940): "The Constitution
guarantees to certain persons the right to demand the exercise of these
powers under certain circumstances. For example, a citizen of a State may
do so when involved in a case or controversy with a citizen of another
State. The mere fact that the Constitution guarantees this right to the
citizens of a State in no way prohibits the Congress from extending that
same privilege to others who are not technically citizens of a State." This
argument is effectively attacked by Judge Coleman in Feely v. Schupper
Interstate Hauling System, supra at 666.6 Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943); Kline v. Burke Construc-
tion Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1922); Sheldon v. Sill, 8 How. 441 (U.S. 1850); United
States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32, 33 (U.S. 1812).
71 STAT. 73 (1789).
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The grant of diversity jurisdiction illustrates the use of legis-
lative discretion, for Congress has always required a minimum
"amount in controversy" as a condition to the vesting of jurisdiction
based on diversity of citizenship." This jurisdictional amount has
been increased,9 so that today diversity jurisdiction attaches only
.. . where the matter in controversy exceeds, exclusive of interest
and costs, the sum or value of $3,000 ..... " This amount is required
also where the basis of jurisdiction is a "federal question."'" The
purpose of the requirement of a minimum amount in controversy
is to prevent an excessive burden of relatively small cases on the
dockets of the federal courts, where state courts exercise concurrent
jurisdiction. 12 The reason generally given for diversity jurisdiction
is that fairness requires that the central government provide a
forum in which all litigants will receive equal justice, and that no
person should be forced to leave his home state and to submit his
interests to the possible prejudice of a distant state court.1 3  In
cases involving a federal question, then, jurisdiction attaches ac-
1 STAT. 78 (1789).
The original Judiciary Act placed the minimum at $500 exclusive of
costs. Note 8 supra. Almost a hundred years later Congress increased the
amount to $2,000 exclusive of interests and costs. 24 STAT. 552 (1887), 25
STAT. 433 (1888). In 1912 the amount was further increased to $3,000 as
quoted in the text above. 36 STAT. 1091 (1912), 28 U.S.C. §41 (1) (1940). A
bill was introduced in Congress in 1928 which would have increased the
amount further from $3,000 to $10,000. BREWSTER, FEDERAL PROCEDURE 41,
n. 35 (1940).
1036 STAT. 1091 (1912), 28 U.S.C. §41 (1) (1940).
1L Note 10 supra. BREwsTER, op. cit. supra, §61. But an exception
arises under the FEDERAL TORT CLAiws ACT, 60 STAT. 843 (1946) as amended
61 STAT. 722 (1947).
12 "It has been repeatedly held... that the intent of all the legislation
since the enactment of the judiciary act of 1789 has been, by the provision
as to amounts, merely to prevent the dockets of the federal courts from
being crowded with small cases . ... " Judge Townsend in Davis v. Mills,
99 Fed. 39, 40 (C.C. Conn. 1900). Compare Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263
(1934).
But "... congressional increases in the jurisdictional amount have
given only the most temporary relief to the district court." DOBME, FEDERAL
PROCEDURE 184 (1928).
13 Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331, 354 (U.S. 1855); Bank of the United
States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61, 87 (U.S. 1809); Whelan v. New York,
L.E.&W. Ry., 35 Fed. 849 (C.C. N.D. Ohio 1888); BREWSTER, FEDERAL PRO-
CEDURE §64 (1940); DoBME, FEDERAL PROCEDURE 184 (1928); Friendly, The
Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HAZv. L. REV. 483 (1928).
Hamilton seemed to argue at one point that diversity jurisdiction was
necessary to enforce the privileges and immunities clause of the Constitu-
tion. But in the same essay he wrote that the jurisdiction of federal courts
ought to comprehend ". . . all those [cases] in which the State tribunals
cannot be supposed to be impartial and unbiased." THE FEDERALIST No. 80
at 494 (Lodge ed. 1888).
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cording to the nature of the matter to be litigated, while in diversity
cases, jurisdiction depends upon the character of the parties.14
When the Constitution was adopted and the Judiciary Act of
1789 was passed, a separate geographical subdivision had not been
created for a capital city; those who dwelt at the seat of the national
government retained citizenship in one of the states.'5 After the
establishment of the District of Columbia,16 however, capital resi-
dents were denied access to federal courts where jurisdiction de-
pended upon diversity of citizenship. In the landmark case, Hep-
burn and Dundas v. Ellzey,'- the Supreme Court was faced with
the question: is the District of Columbia a state within the meaning
of the statute conferring diversity jurisdiction? 8 Chief Justice
Marshall, 9 observing that the Judiciary Act used language similar
14BUNN, JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED
STATES 21-46 (4th ed. 1939); SMIKINS, FEDERAL PRACTICE §22 (3d ed.,
Schweppe, 1938).
This distinction is emphasized here as an aid to clear delimitation of
the discussion to follow, which will be limited to diversity jurisdiction.
25 "This District had been a part of the States of Maryland and Vir-
ginia. It had 'been subject to the Constitution, and was a part of the United
States. The Constitution had attached to it irrevocably. . . The mere
cession of the District of Columbia to the Federal government relinquished
the authority of the states, but it did not take it out of the United States
or from under the aegis of the Constitution. ... Indeed, it would have been
a fanciful construction to hold that territory which had been once a part of
the United States ceased to be such by being ceded directly to the Federal
government." Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 260-261 (1901).
"It is important to bear constantly in mind that the District was made
up of portions of two of the original states of the Union, and was not taken
out of the Union by the cession. Prior thereto its inhabitants were entitled
to all the rights, guaranties, and immunities of the Constitution ....
O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 540 (1933).
1 An Act of July 16, 1790, provided for the establishment of the
District of Columbia, and for the transfer of the seat of government from
Philadelphia to this District in December, 1800. The act provided that state
laws should remain in force in the District until December, 1800, and a
further act of Congress. 1 STAT. 130 (1790). See also 2 STAT. 103 (1801),
which provided for the further continuation in force of state laws in the
District of Columbia.
17 2 Cranch 445 (U.S. 1805).
18 The plaintiffs, both citizens and residents of the District of Columbia,
brought an action against a citizen and resident of Virginia in the Circuit
Court for the Virginia district. The judges could not agree whether there
was or was not diversity jurisdiction of the cause, and the question was
certified to the Supreme Court whether the action could be maintained or
should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The plaintiffs argued that
since the District of Columbia was a separate, organized political society it
was a state as that term is used by writers on general law.
'
9 Marshall, C. J. delivered the opinion of the court. Others present
were Cushing, Paterson, Chase, and Washington, JJ.
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to2" and in reference to the Constitution, looked to that instrument
and concluded that the District of Columbia was not a state within
the meaning of the Constitution.21
Chief Justice Marshall then significantly added the following:
It is true, that as citizens of the United States and of
that particular district which is subject to the jurisdiction
of Congress, it is extraordinary that the courts of the United
States, which are open to aliens and to the citizens of every
state in the union, should be closed upon them. But this
is a subject for legislative, not for judicial consideration.22
(Emphasis supplied.)
The Hepburn decision was followed in a long line of cases2 3
and for more than a century it was considered settled that citizens
of the District of Columbia and the territories could not sue or be
sued in the federal courts on the ground of diversity of citizenship. 24
That the leading case was followed so consistently, however, may
be attributed to the doctrine of stare decisis. The opinion of Judge
Deady in Watson v. Brooks,25 for example, contains a sharp criticism
of the Marshall view:
But it is very doubtful if this ruling would now be
made if the question was one of first impression; and it
is to be hoped it may yet be reviewed and overthrown.
By it, and upon a narrow and technical construction
of the word 'state', unsupported by any argument worthy
of the able and distinguished judge who announced the
opinion of the court, the large and growing population of
American citizens resident in the District of Columbia and
the eight territories of the United States are deprived of
the privilege accorded to all other American citizens, as
-,The Judiciary Act of 1789, §11, added two qualifications not found
in the language of the Constitution: (1) the minimum amount in con-
troversy and (2) a requirement that the action be brought in a state of
which one of the parties was a citizen. 1 STAT. 78 (1789).
21 The opinion reasons that if the District of Columbia is excluded
under the terms of the articles governing the legislative and executive
branches, the same result must follow in the interpretation of the judicial
article. This reasoning has not been carried to a logical conclusion, even
by Chief Justice Marshall. See, e.g., Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheat. 317
(U.S. 1820).
22Hepburn & Dundas v. Ellzey, 2 Cranch at 453.
?aHooe v. Jamieson, 166 U.S. 395 (1897); Barney v. Baltimore, 6 Wall.
280 (U.S. 1867); New Orleans v. Winter, 1 Wheat. 89 (U.S. 1816); Watson
v. Brooks, 13 Fed. 540 (C.C.D. Ore. 1882); Cf. Hodgson & Thompson v.
Bowerbank, 5 Cranch 303 (U.S. 1809).
2 "Nothing is better settled than that a citizen of the United States
residing in a territory or the District of Columbia cannot sustain as plaintiff
or defendant an action based upon diversity of citizenship in the federal
courts." WILLIAMS, JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE or FEDERAL COURTS 65 (1917).
2 13 Fed. 540 (C.C.D. Ore. 1882).
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well as aliens, of going into the national courts when
obliged to assert or defend their legal rights away from
home.
2 6
In* 1940 Congress acted. An amendment to the Judicial Code
made the pertinent section read: "The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction . . .of all suits of a civil nature . . .where
the matter in controversy exceeds ... three thousand dollars, and
... is between citizens of different States, or citizens of the District
of Columbia, the Territory of Hawaii, or Alaska, and any State or
Territory...-27 (Amendment in italics.)
This amendment touched off a sequence of spirited litigation
in which the old cases have been rather thoroughly reexamined.
Eleven district court cases 26 and two circuit court of appeals cases 2
have decided the question" of the constitutionality of the 1940
amendment. In the district courts the score has been eight to three
against constitutionality.3 1 Both circuit courts have held the statute
26Id. at 544.
27 54 STAT. 143, 28 U.S.C. §41 (1) (b) (1940).
Willis v. Dennis, 72 F. Supp. 853 (W.D. Va. 1947) unconstitutional;
Duze v. Wooley, 72 F. Supp. 422 (D. Hawaii 1947) constitutional; Feely v.
Schupper Interstate Hauling System, 72 F. Supp. 663 (D. Md. 1947) uncon-
stitutional; Wilson v. Guggenheim, 70 F. Supp. 417 (E.D.S.C. 1947) uncon-
stitutional; Ostrow v. Samuel Brilliant Co., 66 F. Supp. 593 (D. Mass. 1946)
unconstitutional; Behlert v. James Foundation, 60 F. Supp. 706 (S.D. N.Y.
1945) unconstitutional; Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. George-Howard,
55 F. Supp. 921 (W.D. Mo. 1944) unconstitutional by implication; Glaesar v.
Acacia Mutual Life Association, 55 F. Supp. 925 (N.D. Cal. 1944) constitu-
tional; McGarry v. City of Bethlehem, 45 F. Supp. 385 (E.D. Pa. 1942) un-
constitutional; Winkler v. Daniels, 43 F. Supp. 265 (E.D. Va. 1942) constitu-
tional; National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transferf Co., unreported
(D. Md. 1947), aif'd, 165 F. 2d 531 (C.C.A. 4th 1947) unconstitutional.
29National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 165 F. 2d
531 (C.C.A. 4th 1947); Central States Co-operatives v. Watson Bros. Trans-
portation Co., 165 F. 2d 392 (C.C.A. 7th 1947). The question of constitu-
tionality was raised for the first time in the latter case in the appellate
court. It was raised on motion of the defendant, who had invoked the juris-
diction of the district court by removal from a municipal court of Chicago,
in which he had been sued by a corporation of the District of Columbia.
30 "The question involved is not a theoretical one, but one of great
practical significance. To deny to a citizen of the District the right to re-
sort to the federal courts, means that he must seek justice in a court of The
state of his adversary, where he will find, in many of the states, that trial
by jury has been stripped of many of its safeguards and the judge has been
denied the common law powers necessary to the proper administration of
justice." Circuit Judge Parker, dissenting in National Mutual Insurance
Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., supra note 27 at 536 n.
31 See note 27 supra.
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invalid over the vigorous dissent of the senior judge in each cir-
cuit 3
-
The language of this amendment is ambiguous.3 3 It might be
literally interpreted to mean, for example, that a citizen of the Dis-
trict of Columbia could now sue a state in the federal courts. If
such were the meaning, the act would contravene the Eleventh
Amendment, which provides that "the Judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citi-
zens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any Foreign
State. ' 34 The purpose of the amendment, however, has been quite
clear, viz., to put citizens of the District of Columbia and the named
territories in the same position with regard to diversity jurisdic-
tion as a citizen of one of the forty-eight states.33 The courts have
given the amendment a meaning consistent with such a purpose.36
The divergent views on the question of constitutionality may
be brought into sharp focus by a summary statement of an argu-
ment in support of each.3
1. The view that the amendment is unconstitutional:
A federal court is classified under the Constitution according
to the particular part of that basic instrument from which came
the authority for its creation.3 A court which was contemplated
by the Judicial Article of the Constitution is denominated a con-
stitutional court.3 9 On the other hand, a court which was created
by Congress under powers granted in other parts of the Constitu-
tion is a legislative court.40  Congress may assign to legislative
courts administrative and legislative functions,41 but constitutional
3? Circuit Judge Parker in the 4th Circuit, 165 F. 2d 531, 536; Circuit
Judge Evans in the 7th Circuit, 165 F. 2d 392, 398.
3 Several possible interpretations of this amendment are examined,
and more precise language is suggested in Dykes and Keeffe, The 1940
Amendment to the Diversity of Citizenship Clause, 21 TULANE L. REV. 171,
177-180 (1946).
34See McGarry v. City of Bethlehem, 45 F. Supp. 385, 386 (E.D. Pa.
1942). If a state were a party plaintiff, the 11th Amendment would be
avoided. But a state is not a citizen under diversity jurisdiction provisions.
7 WORDS & PHRASES 218-219 (1940) and cases there collected.
35 H. R. REP. No. 1756, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940).
36 See notes 26, 27, and 32 supra.
3 No attempt is made here to analyze, evaluate, or summarize the
opinions of the courts, but rather to state briefly the main points on which
the clear-cut difference of opinion on this subject is rested.
38 BREWSTER, FEDERAL PROCEDURE §§85, 86 (1940) and cases there cited.
39Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, syl. 3 (1929).
40Id. syl. 4.
- Examples are the Court of Claims, the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals, the United States Customs Court, and the United States Court for
China. See note 38 supra.
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courts are limited to the hearing and decision of cases in the con-
stitutional sense, that is, limited to purely judicial functions. This
is true because the powers which may be granted to a constitu-
tional court are expressly limited by the very same article which
authorizes the creation of the court.42
Since the federal district courts clearly are constitutional
courts, their jurisdiction is limited by Article III. Does the judicial
article permit the jurisdiction which Congress intended to add by
this amendment? It does, only if a citizen of the District of Columbia
is a citizen of a state. But it has been settled since the time of John
Marshall that in Article III, Section 2, the word "state" excludes
this unique district and the territories.43 It is inescapable, then,
that Congress is without power so to extend the jurisdiction of the
district courts - unless another provision of the Constitution so
conditions the restraint of the judicial article as to allow the Con-
gress an increment of power.
It is said that Congress here acted under its plenary power to
legislate for the District of Columbia granted by Article I, Section
8.44 It is conceded that by this provision the national legislature
has sweeping powers over the District,4 but it is insisted that this
prerogative is limited to the District. Companion provisions of
the Constitution must be interpreted so as to harmonize them, to
make each effective in its proper sphere. It is a spurious argument
which says that a power to legislate over an area ten miles square
is sufficient to authorize an extension of the jurisdiction of the
federal courts in every state in the Union when the article govern-
ing the judicial power expressly forbids.
The case of O'Donoghue v. United States46 is not an authority
for the opposite view. That case did hold that constitutional courts
in the District of Columbia could be given jurisdiction under Article
I, Section 8. But the opinion of Mr. Justice Sutherland expressly
denies that such powers could be extended to the constitutional
courts outside the District of Columbia. ¢
The position taken by Chief Justice Marshall on this question
negatives the idea that he would suggest that a statute could change
this "extraordinary" situation. It is wholly consistent with his re-
corded views to say that he believed that the Constitution must be
42 See notes 38 and 39 supra.
43 See notes 22 and 23 supra.
-H. R. REP. No. 1756, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940).
4 See Neild v. District of Columbia, 110 F. 2d 246, 249-251 (App. D.C.
1940).
46289 U.S. 516 (1933).
4 7 Id. at 551. See National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer
Co., 165 F. 2d at 535.
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c/ganged to accomplish this end. To amend the Constitution is S
legIqlative, not a judicial function, "Turn to the article of ,th
CFtitution of the United -States, for the statute annot, extend
tle jurisdiction ,beyond- the, limi s -of the Constitution. ' 4 ,
2. The view that the ameAdmentcisr donstitutional:
Precedent has, been so powerful in this area that few' argument,
hav- heen-madeqo Sidgest thatthe District of Columbia might nov
be> chlled'a state *ithm theieanmg of this one clause, of the Con,
stitiitOh.- In the 'five recen1t,"pniiofis ii'rsupport of the 1940 aimend.
mefif. ihdf& ar - 16fiYbows 'td pr&6edenf oi this score4 ' For th(
fiEseht purpog&, theniit is assiied that the District of Colunibu
is'nbt a state within the meaning of'Article III, Section 2.J - - I - I"The positi of the District of Columbia has been desrbed a,
extiaorihary' , anomqous" "'uque." The framers of tO
Constitution sought to provide for this s Pu .t onvtAtwj very brow
grant of power to legislate concerning the Distrmc5 and a "neces
sary and proper" clause.- Suiely one- of the primary obligatjti
o. goyprnment, s seclirjuStiCe for-its people. Dohes the Consti
tution prevent Congress's ,securmg equal justice for these citizen
because. the Diptrict,.of -Columbia is not a state?- There is ever.
reason to believe -that the framers intended to give to the legisla
ture all the power nevessary- to the. effective government of- thi
federal district;.It is -clear that Congress- can create courts unde
authority other than the article on the judiciary;-5 for examplE
courts could be established the nation over to handle litigation in
volving citizens of the District. -Cannnt these -cases :be -handled 11
theQurts already:eoxisting '75 '4 "
Jutc Mar A -v. . J.3 anI1 48 Chief Justice Marshall in Hodgson & Thompsor v. Bprbank,
Cranch 303 (TS.1 809)
-. Only 'the o&firon of Circ~it Judge Evans argues it t the Dis£i ct-c
Columia should mnw,-be called a state under the diversity- clause. Thl
opinion distinguishes the Hepburn case, imiting the latter to-an m nerpreta
tion of a statute. "Our first case controls, if-it be in point. It was decide
b -the'Supreme 'Court. Justice Marshall spoke for th dourr'Ctht alo
is saffi6ient to paralyze any doubting Thomas unles'he can dl tingai.1v3it
l65-iF 2d at:398.
.5o Chief Justice Marshall in Hepburn 4 Dun1sv, Ellzey 2 Crarplu-
4-45.
11 Judge Waring in Wilson v. Guggenheun, 70 F Supp. 417, 4,
(E.D.S.C. 1947)
52 Ibid.
5U. S. >CONST. Art. I, §8 (17)
54'. S. CONST. Art. I, §8(18)
55 See note 41 supra.
6See opinipn-ofCircuit Judge Parker, dis senting in National Mutu
Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 165 F 2d at 53:,
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O'Donoghue v. United States 7 held that a constitutional court
in the District of Columbia can be given non-judicial powers and
functions under provisions of the Constitution other than the ju-
dicial article. Surely, then, the other constitutional courts can be
given judicial power under provisions other than Article Inl. The
power here sought to be conferred is judicial in the strict or con-
stitutional sense. It is not even suggested that Congress could give
the federal courts in all the states non-judicial power under Article
I, Section 8. This act seeks to grant to the district courts only the
same type of jurisdiction the courts have always had, that is, juris-
diction where the parties are citizens of the United States, but not
citizens of the same state.
The question of constitutionality must be answered by refer-
ence to the whole Constitution. Article III, Section 2 may not in-
clude a grant of. this power. But is the entire charter of our gov-
ernment so drawn that Congress is powerless to treat all American
citizens alike when they assert their legal rights?
Chief Justice Marshall thought it was extraordinary that all
were not treated alike -"But this is a subject for legislative . . .
consideration.M8 If, by that, the great chief justice meant to say
that an act of the legislature would be void and a constitutional
amendment would be necessary, he would have chosen more re-
vealing words.
Alexander Hamilton must have believed that this type of
change in jurisdiction was authorized by the Constitution. In writ-
ing on the provisions for the federal judiciary he concluded:
From this review of the particular powers of the fed-
eral judiciary, as marked out in the Constitution, it ap-
pears that they are all conformable to the principles which,
ought to have governed the structure of that department,
and which were necessary to the perfection of the system.
If some partial inconveniences should appear to be con-
nected with the incorporation of any of them into the plan,
it ought to be recollected that the national legislature will
have ample authority to make such exceptions, and to pre-
scribe such regulations as will be calculated to obviate or
remove these inconveniences. The possibility of particular
mischiefs can never be viewed, by a well-informed mind,
as a solid objection to a general principle, which is cal-
culated to avoid general mischiefs and to attain general
advantages. 9
To hold that the Constitution does not allow this act is to
impute to the framers an intent which few, if any, Americans had
thought they had. It is unbelievable that the framers of our gov-
57 289 U.S. 516 (1933).
58 2 Cranch 445 (U.S. 1805).
59 THE FEDERALIST No. 80 at 501 (Lodge ed. 1888).
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ernment really intended to treat some citizens one way and others
another way, when all were seeking justice.
The arguments sketched above would seem to present a rather
well-defined choice for the Supreme Court, should this question go
there for a final answer. But it is believed that the Supreme Court
would not be restricted to one or the other of these general ap-
proaches. Whereas the judicial arguments to date have, with one
exception, 0 conceded that the District of Columbia is not a state,
it does not seem unreasonable to consider the possibility that the
highest court may answer the problem with the simple assertion
that the District of Columbia is a state for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction. The 80th Congress may enact a bill, already passed
by the House, which would seek to accomplish this by adding to
the pertinent section of the Judicial Code: "The word 'States,' as
used in this section, includes the Territories and .the District of
Columbia."'" Such a statutory change would not resolve the con-
stitutional difficulty- it would persist. A judicial revision of this
definition would settle the problem.
To treat the District of Columbia as a state is not at all extra-
ordinary. Yet it is admittedly extraordinary that citizens of the
District are denied equal rights of access to the courts of the only
government to which they owe allegiance.
The District of Columbia has been held to be one of the "states
of the Union" within the meaning of treaties with foreign coun-
tries.6 2 The same result has been reached in dealing with statutes;
for example, the District is a state within the meaning of the Bank-
ruptcy Act63 and a federal statute authorizing each "state" to tax
national bank shares.6 4 It has been called a state by federal courts 5
and, state courts66 alike. And it is a recognized principle of consti-
60 See opinion of Circuit Judge Evans, dissenting in Central States
Co-operatives v. Watson Bros. Transportation Co., 165 F. 2d at 298.
61 H. R. 3214, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. §1332 (1947).
62 Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 syl. 3 (1890). See Downes v. Bidwell,
182 U.S. 244, 270 (1901), where it is said "That the District of Columbia and
the territories are States, as that word is used in treaties with foreign
powers, with respect to the ownership, disposition, and inheritance of prop-
erty."
63In re Vidal, 233 Fed. 733, 735 (1916).
61 "Rnv. STAT. §5219, as amended, U.S.C. Supp., Title 12, §741, defining
and limiting the permitted taxation of national banks and their shares by
States applies to Puerto Rico." Domenech v. National City Bank, 294 U.S.
199, syl. 4 (1935).
6 See notes 63 and 64 supra.
66 See Symons v. Eichelberger, 110 Ohio St. 224, 230, 144 N.E. 279, 280
(1924). An Illinois statute provides that the word "state" may be construed
to include the District of Columbia and the territories. ILL. REV. STAT. c. 131,
§1.14 (1945).
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tutional interpretation that a provision of a constitution is gener-
ally given a broader meaning than that of a statute.
6 7
The word "state" as it appears in the Constitution has been
held to include the District of Columbia. Trial by jury is guaran-
teed to citizens of the federal District by Article III, Section 2, the
article on the judiciary. 8 The commerce clause in Article I reads,
"To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the sev-
eral States, and with the Indian Tribes."60 The District of Colum-
bia is a state under the commerce clause.7 0 Yet Chief Justice
Marshall argued that since Articles I and II on the legislative and
executive departments did not embrace the District of Columbia,
the same result should follow in Article III.
1
.
But Marshall himself was hardly consistent. Congress levied
a direct tax in the apportionment of which the District of Columbia
was included as well as the states.72 Article I of the Constitution
provided that "Representatives and direct Taxes shall be appor-
tioned among the several States which may be included within this
Union according to their respective numbers .... ,,73 It was argued
before the Supreme Court that the District was not included in the
terms of this provision, because Columbia is not a state under the
Constitution. Chief Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the
Court, which held: "Congress has authority to impose a direct tax
on the District of Columbia in proportion to the census directed to
be taken by the constitution." 74 (Emphasis supplied) In the same
case he wrote "If, then, the language of the Constitution be con-
strued to comprehend territories and the District of Columbia, as
well as the states, that language confers on Congress the power of
taxing the district and territories as well as the states."75
It has been said that in the majority of cases arising under the
Constitution, the District of Columbia has been treated as a state.7 6
67 See Lamar v. United States, 240 U.S. 60 (1916).
68 Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888).
69 U. S. CONST. ART. I, §8 (3).
70Hanley v. Kansas C.S. Ry, 187 U.S. 617 (1903); Stoutenburgh v.
Hennick, 129 U.S. 141 (1889).
71 Hepburn & Dundas v. Eflzey, 2 Cranch 445 (U.S. 1805).
7 2 DILLON, MARSHALL, COMPLETE CoNsTITUTIoNAL DECISIONS ANNO. 340
(1903).
73 U. S. CoNsT. ART I, §2 (3). This provision was amended by AMEND.
XIV, §2, and AMEND. XVI.
74 Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheat. 317, syl. 1 (U.S. 1820).
751d. at 323.
76 "if a numerical recapitulation were made of the instances in which
the word 'state' has been considered as including the District of Columbia
and the territories and of the instances in which it has not, undoubtedly
the former would be the larger of the totals." Comment, 29 GEO. L. J. 193,
198 (1940). See 46 COL. L. REV. 125, 126 n. 6 (1946).
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It is believed that the courts generally have included the District
as a state where that was necessary in order to reach a proper re-
sult, a result consistent with the spirit of our democratic govern-
ment. Equality of citizens is a foundation stone of the American
government. This may be a situation in which the Supreme Court
will include the citizens of the District of Columbia as equals of
their fellow citizens in this respect, without deserting the principles
of the constitutional Union.
Charles W. Davidson, Jr.
The Power of the District Courts of the United States
To Remand or Dismiss as Affected by H. R. 3214
H.R. 3214, the proposed revision of title 28 of. the United States
Code,' omits the present Section 802 which reads as follows:
If in any suit commenced in a district court or removed
from a state court to a district court of the United States,
it shall appear to the satisfaction of said district court, at
any time after such suit has been brought or removed
thereto, that such a suit does not really and substantially
involve a dispute or controversy properly within the juris-
diction of said district court, or that the parties to said suit
have been improperly or collusively joined, either as plain-
tiffs or defendants, for the purpose of creating a case cog-
nizable or removable under this chapter, the said district
court shall dismiss the suit or remand it to the court from
which it was removed, as justice may require, and shall
make such order as to costs as shall be just.
H.R. 3214 provides that the district court shall "not have juris-
diction of a civil action in which any party... has been improperly
or collusively ... joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such court,"'
but omits the provision that the district court shall dismiss or re-
mand a suit when it appears that it "does not really and substanti-
ally involve a dispute or controversy properly within the jurisdic-
tion of said district court.14
Will this omission affect the power of the district court to dis-
miss cases coming before it for lack or loss of jurisdiction? The
Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives evi-
dently thought not for in referring to this omission it stated:
' Title 28 of the United States Code is being revised by the Congress
of the United States. This bill, which will replace the present title 28 was
passed by the House of Representatives as H.R. 3214 on July 7, 1947, and
was referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.
236 STAT. 1090 (1911), 28 U.S.C. §80 (1940).
3H.R. 3214 §1359.
4 18 STAT. 470 (1875).
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